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REFINING TilE LAWMAKING FUNCfiON OF 
THE SUPREME COURT 
Frederick Schauer* 
I. 
In some contexts it is considered completely unthinkable to suggest 
that the Supreme Court of the United States makes law, as opposed 
merely to interpreting or applying the law made by others. 1 In other 
contexts, including most especially the legal academy, denial of the 
Court's lawmaking activity is considered conclusive evidence of pro-
fessional incompetence. 2 But however obvious it may be that the 
Supreme Court makes law all the time, we have ignored an important 
ambiguity about the notion of "making law," and as a result have 
paid far too little attention to an important aspect of the task before 
the Supreme Court. 
In the sense in which the "making law" notion is most commonly 
used with reference to Supreme Court adjudication, the lawmaking 
function is primarily backward looking. The talk of "making law" 
occurs in the context of the sources of the norms for making the deci-
sions in cases currently before the Court. The very fact that a case 
is indeed before the Court means in most instances that the relevant 
controversy has already ripened, and the task of the Court is to make 
a decision between the parties in the existing controversy. To the extent 
that its decision is based on norms not already embodied in authoritative 
legal materials, 3 the Court is accused of, or praised for, making law. 
But in another sense, the notion of making law .is forward looking. 
• Cutler Professor of Law, College of William and Mary; Visiting Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Michigan, 1983-1984. A.B., 1967, M.B.A., 1968, Dartmouth College; J.D., 1972, Har-
vard University. 
1. The best example of a context in which the Supreme Court is viewed as properly only 
applying law made by others is the Court's direct interaction with the political branches of govern-
ment, particularly the Senate on the occasion of consideration of a Supreme Court nominee. 
See Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Jnterpretivism and Neutral Prin-
ciples, 96 HARv. L. REv. 781, 781-82 (1983). . 
2. /d. at 781; see also J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 11-41 (1980). Ronald Dworkin 
denies that judges normally do or should make law, R. DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 
(1977), but I feel quite confident in assuming that Dworkin's model of adjudication would garner 
little admiration from Senator Hatch, see Tushnet, supra note 1, at 781 n.l. 
3. The domain of "authoritative legal materials" is, of course, highly contested, and the 
characterization in the text is intended to be neutral about the extent to which the text, original 
intent, and other sources are permissible or mandatory sources of "law." This is the full field 
of constitutional theory, and I do not wish to deal with those issues here. See generally J. ELY, 
1 
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For the Court makes law not only when it applies new norms to decide 
actual controversies, but also when it sets forth a standard, or princi-
ple, or rule that is to be followed and applied by those to whom it 
is addressed. To the extent that we expect others to follow the Supreme 
Court's lead, and to obey its directives, then those others4 occupy a 
position with respect to the Court that is not dissimilar to that occupied 
by the citizen with respect to a legislature. These others expect to be 
able to follow the guidance of the Supreme Court, and it is not 
unreasonable to suggest that the demands made by the citizenry on 
its legislatures in terms of the process of setting forth directives are 
or should be paralleled by the demands made on the Supreme Court 
by those who must heed it. 
In this Article, I will address this second type of lawmaking. I want 
to explore the ways in which the Supreme Court, in its opinions, 5 does 
and can guide the conduct of lower courts, legislatures, government 
agencies, government employees, and the public at large. Each of these 
groups, and others, is likely at times to have some direct need to know 
what the law is. And to the extent that part of our law is set forth 
in the opinions of the Supreme Court, this aspect of the craft of law-
making should not be ignored. Although it is common in academic 
discourse and classroom discussions in law schools to emphasize the 
weaknesses in Supreme Court opinions, this is a luxury not available 
to the conscientious lower court judge, legislator, head of an executive 
department, or cop on the beat. The people occupying these roles may 
not be totally unconcerned with whether the law is right or wrong, 
but they have a much more direct concern with simply knowing what 
supra note 2; Constitutional Adjudication and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 259 (1981); 
Judicial Review versus Democracy, 42 OHio ST. L.J. 1 (1981). 
4. The text is deliberately vague about who those "others" are, because much of this article 
deals with the various groups - lower courts, legislative bodies, public agencies and officials, 
the general public - that might constitute the class of "others." 
5. A related issue is the extent to which the_ Court exercises its influence by means other 
than its opinions. In many respects it is not what the Court says that is important, but what 
the newspapers and television news stories say the Court said. The dynamics of this process 
are beyond the scope of what I can plausibly do in this Article, but it seems clear that the factor 
of popular interpretation of Court opinions is not an irrelevant factor in the guidance process. 
For example, the necessity of the corrective decision of Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974), 
is accountable far more to the misreporting of the notion of local community standards in obscenity 
prosecutions in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), than to anything that can be found 
in Miller itself. 
Similar considerations relate to the Court's "nondecisions." It is technically true that denials 
of certiorari are not decisions on the merits and have no precedential value. Maryland v. Baltimore 
Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 917-20 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., respecting the denial of certiorari); 
Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1227 (1979). But that is not 
the same thing as saying that they may not serve to channel behavior; on the contrary, denials 
of certiorari may influence behavior, either because lawyers perceive the Court as unwilling to 
review an issue, or because denials of certiorari are publicly reported in the press as "upholding" 
the decision below. 
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the law is.6 When the law that governs them emanates from the Supreme 
Court, the effectiveness of Supreme Court lawmaking depends on the 
ability of the Court to perform its role in the process. Consequently, 
the guidance function of the Court deserves close scrutiny. 
The process I want to explore is not isolated. It exists in every Supreme 
Court opinion that might have to be interpreted and followed by some 
other actor or entity. But this does not mean that the importance of 
the lawmaking function cannot vary considerably from case to case. 
The decision of a contested boundary dispute between two states is 
unlikely seriously to implicate the full range of potential problems 
associated with the Supreme Court's promulgation of norms to govern 
future conduct. But consider, by contrast, Miranda v. Arizona.' The 
most striking facet of a Miranda warning is that a police officer ,1 one 
of hundreds of thousands similarly situated, is in effect reading directly 
from a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. In some 
sense there is a "chain of command," or at least a chain of review, 
between the police officer and the Justices of the Supreme Court. There 
are police supervisors and commissioners, who in turn are under the 
direction of various state and local political subdivisions, which in turn 
are subject to the decisions of state and federal trial courts, and these 
courts are subject to the control of appellate courts, which are, finally l 
under the direct supervision of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
The fascinating thing about a Miranda warning is that the decision 
in Miranda leapfrogs every single one of these intermediate points in 
the chain of review and the chain of direction and control. In Miranda, 
the Justices are speaking directly to the cop on the beat. 
A somewhat different example of the same process exists with respect 
to the relevant constitutional standards sufficient to convict on obscenity 
charges. 8 Miller v. Ca/ifornia9 is not only the decision in the litigation 
between Marvin Miller and the People of the State of California, and 
it not only contains general statements by the Supreme Court about 
the ways in which the definition of obscenity is constrained by first 
amendment considerations, but it also announces virtually exact in-
structions to be given to juries in obscenity cases. Miller is not only 
Supreme Court opinion, but formbook as well, speaking directly and 
unequivocally to every trial judge in the country. 10 
In other instances the Court is talking to smaller or different 
6. See generally H. HART, THE CoNcEPT OF LAw 79-88, 132-44 (1961). 
7. 384 u.s. 436 (1966). 
8. Miller v.- California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
9. 413 U.S. at 24-25. 
10. There is, of course, no necessity that jury instructions, or statutes, be direct quotations 
from Miller or any other Supreme Court opinion. But such a use of a Court opinion is un-
doubtedly the safest course, and it is thus inevitable that it will be followed. 
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audiences. In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha11 and 
Powell v. McCormack, 12 for example, the Court is speaking directly 
to Congress, telling it how it must legislate or conduct its internal affairs 
in the future. In Reynolds v. Sims13 and Avery v. Midland County, 14 
the Court is talking directly to state and local legislative bodies, telling 
them how they must apportion their representation to stay within the 
mandates of the equal protection clause. And, most commonly of all, 
the Court is talking to other courts, providing not only direction but 
mandate as well, as lower trial and appellate courts apply the rulings 
of the Supreme Court to the cases before them. 1 s 
In each of these instances someone is following the directions of 
the Supreme Court. But how good a director is the Court? How can 
it ber.t perform the function of directing? What are the costs to the 
Court's other functions if it emphasizes or overemphasizes the directing 
function? Addressing this group of questions is my task here, but merely 
pointing out that they exist may be sufficient to justify this endeavor. 
II. 
The lawmaking or directing function that I am discussing is in no 
way peculiar to the Supreme Court of the United States. The task of 
guidance is performed by all appellate courts and by aily other decision-
making entity that writes opinions when it makes a decision.' 6 Never-
theless, I want to focus on the Supreme Court here for several reasons, 
only one of which is that Supreme Court adjudication of constitutional 
issues happens to be my primary area of interest. 
Apart from my desire to write about what I know best, concentra-
tion on the Supreme Court, at least in this initial exploration of the 
topic, seems to make sense. By virtue of being at the apex of the judicial 
pyramid, the Supreme Court's directives bind the greatest number of 
other entities. Thus, the impact of Supreme Court deficiency in issuing 
these directives is likely to be the greatest. Moreover, the issues decid-
11. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). 
12. 395 u.s. 486 (1969). 
13. 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding existing Alabama apportionment scheme and proposed plans 
constitutionally invalid because neither legislative house is or would be apportioned on a population 
basis). 
14. 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (holding that local units with general governmental power over an 
entire geographic area may not, consistently with the equal protection clause, be apportioned 
among single-member districts of substantially unequal population). 
15. I reject any form of extreme Legal Realism that would deny that lower court judges 
can be and are in fact influenced and usually controlled by the collection of symbols that we 
call binding precedent. For my reasons for reaching this conclusion, see Schauer, Easy Cases, 
58 So. CAL. L. REv. (forthcoming). 
16. We should not ignore the extent to which labor arbitrators, hearing officers, administrative 
tribunals, and many other bodies write opinions that serve as a basis for guidance by others. 
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ed by the Supreme Court are almost exclusively issues of public law. 
Although private parties undoubtedly have an interest in knowing what 
the law is in order that they may best order their private transactions, 
the nature of the common law process is such that we have made the 
decision that judicial guidance to future private parties, albeit useful, 
is in the long run less important than the advantages of case-by-case 
adjudication with a slow and often sputtering development of general 
principles.17 These assumptions of the common law method are not 
. 
immune from reconsideration, but such a task is well beyond the more 
modest goals I set for myself here. 
In the area of public law, however, it is likely that the considera-
tions are different. Because a judicial decision with respect to the 
activities of a governmental agency can affect every person within the 
potential control of that agency, the consequences of a failure to guide 
that agency are considerably more widespread. Moreover, with respect 
to constitutional constraints on governmental action, t}lere is a sense 
in which it is especially troubling that government might not know 
what is constitutionally required of it. Thus, the kinds of issues decided 
by the Supreme Court may be different in kind as well as in general 
importance from those decided by other courts, and focusing this in-
quiry on the Supreme Court may offer special insights. 
Finally, the Supreme Court is a peculiarly public institution. Its opin-
ions are a matter of public as well as professional legal scrutiny, and 
it is quite often speaking to the nation as a whole as much as it is 
speaking particularly to those who might have to follow its decisions. 
As a result, its audience is always, albeit indirectly, the entire popula-
tion, and its ability to direct is of great political as well as more nar-
rowly legal importance. 
III. 
The case or controversy requirement18 has the effect of ensuring that 
judicial lawmaking will not occur except as it is at least prompted by 
an act of adjudication. But the fact that adjudication of the rights 
of specific parties and lawmaking in the instant sense inevitably occur 
in tandem should not cause us to forget that they are two quite dif-
ferent functions. 
In the strictest sense an act of adjudication can take place even though 
no opinion at all is offered. The adjudicator listens to the parties, decides 
who wins, and announces the result. This is what happens all the time 
17. See generally G. CAI.ABRESI, A CoMMoN LAW FOR THB AoE oF STATUTES (1982); N. MAc-
CoiUilcK, LEGAL REAsoNING AND LEGAL THEORY (1978). 
18. u.s. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
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in lower courts and is in fact becoming increasingly prevalent in ap-
pellate courts. 19 Although providing reasons for a decision is often con-
sidered a central part of the notion of due process of law, 20 reasons 
that are provided in compliance with this requirement are still being 
provided solely for the benefit of the parties before the court. As a 
result, an opinion issued solely from an adjudicatory perspective can· 
be exclusively related to the particular circumstances and issues before 
the court. 
In contrast, there is no reason that lawmaking need take place in 
the context of a ripe dispute between opposing parties. Legislative 
promulgation of norms, although inevitably inspired by particular 
factual assumptions and specific events thought to require legislative 
reaction, still takes place in a setting divorced from the necessity of 
deciding a specific controversy between designated parties. The pro-
cess by which a particular institution announces a directive to be followed 
by others is a process that can and frequently (indeed, most com-
monly) does occur in settings in which there are no specific winners 
or losers. Lawmaking, qua lawmaking, is therefore distinct from the 
process of adjudication. 
All of"this is so commonplace as to approach the trivial. Yet it is 
necessary to restate the obvious in order to set the stage for the prob-
lem. For the difficulty .we. confront is that the Supreme Court is in-
evitably charged with the task, in each case, of both adjudicating and 
lawmaking. To the extent that it promulgates norms for the guidance 
of lower courts, legislatures, executive departments, public employees, 
and the public, the Court is exercising the lawmaking function, yet 
it is forced to do so in the setting and under conditions primarily de-
signed for the distinct function of adjudication. Because of its primary 
design for adjudication- the Supreme Court is, after all, a court-
commentary on the performance of the Court has tended to focus on 
the adjudicatory function, and perhaps the reasoning process as well, 
but not on the ability of the product of the Court's work to establish 
effectively norms that can be followed by others. 21 
The primary source of the analytical difficulty, however, is not that 
adjudication and lawmaking are two distinct functions. Rather, it is 
that those two functions are in inevitable tension with each other, tension 
19. See generally Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United 
States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. Cm. L. REv. 573 (1981). 
20. See, e.g., Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156 (1962). 
21. I have noted the issue previously. Schauer, "Private" Speech and the "Private" Forum: 
Givhan v. Western Line School District, 1919 SUP. CT. REv. 217, 217-18. The issue is dealt 
with in some more detail in Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARv. L. REv. 
802, 807-11 (1982); see also Deutsch, Precedent and Adjudication, 83 YALB L.J. 1553 (1974); 
LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson 
Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REv. 127. 
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that verges on inconsistency. The process of lawmaking is a process 
of establishing a rule. 22 And in establishing a rule, the rule maker uses. 
the rule to exclude certain factors from consideration in the future while 
at the same elevating certain other factors to special importance. 23 The 
lawyers' "facts of the case," after all, are not all of the facts that 
are related to the transaction before a court. They are only those facts 
that a legal rule, established prior to the event, has deemed will be 
legally relevant in determining the rights and duties arising out of the 
transaction. 24 But a legal rule, excluding all but certain designated facts 
from consideration, precedes in time the events that it governs. Thus, 
the formulation of the rule is at best a prediction. It is an assessment, 
in advance, of what facts are likely to exist, of which of those facts 
we wish to control, and of which of those facts we wish to exclude 
from consideration by the decision maker. But because the formula-
tion of the rule is in this sense only a prediction, and because our predic-
tions, lacking omniscience, 25 may be incorrect, the process of lawmak-
ing, or rule formulation, is inevitably coarse. It excludes from future 
consideration facts that might be important in the future but that we 
cannot foresee today. To deal with future conduct by rule, therefore, 
entails the risk of being precluded from considering certain facts that 
we would, ideally, wish· to take into acount in reaching a decision in 
the -case at hand. 
To the extent that we can stylize and idealize the adjudicative 
function, 26 however, the idea of excluding certain facts from considera-
tion may disable us from reaching the ideal solution in the individual 
case before the adjudicator. If we seek to be most just in the par-
ticular case, to achieve the optimal result in each case, we should not, 
in advance and with imperfect knowledge of the future, exclude cer-
tain potentially important factors from our consideration. To constrict 
the relevant context of adjudication entails a substantial risk of deflec-
tion of results from the optimal. Because the process of laying down 
relatively clear strictures for the future involves doing just that, the 
consequence is that exercising the lawmaking function inevitably detracts 
from optimal exercise of the adjudicative function. This does not mean 
22. I use "rule" here in a quite loose sense, and I do not mean to distinguish rules from 
principles or other sorts of standards. 
23. It is by his choice of the material facts that the judge creates the law •... To 
ignore his choice is to miss the whole point of the case. Our system of precedent becomes 
meaningless if we say that we will accept his conclusion but not his view of the facts. 
Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 169 (1930); see also 
G. Gommu, THE Lomc oF CHOicE 46 (1968). 
24. G. GOTrtiEB, supra note 23. 
25. See H. HART, supra note 6, at 125-26. 
26. Adjudication serves many purposes, and the relationship among them is complex. Here 
I am artificially narrowing the adjudicative function to ignore a wide range of interests other 
than those of achieving the best resolution of a dispute involving only two parties. 
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that some accommodation between these competing goals is not possi-
ble. It means only that we must realize that they are competing, and 
that any increase in one must come at the expense of the other. 
IV. 
In addition to the tension between the adjudicative and lawmaking 
functions, there is the tension between the desire to achieve the cor-
rect, or at least optimal, result, and the desire to provide guidance 
to lower courts and others. To the extent that the Court resolves quickly 
and clearly an issue of concern, it heeds its lawmaking function, but 
possibly at the cost of a less than perfect resolution of that issue. Ideally, 
in terms of achieving the best result, the Court ought to delay decision 
until a number of different factual circumstances have presented 
themselves in the lower courts. In formulating a rule, the rule-making 
body attempts to imagine at least a fairly extensive sample of the types 
of situations that are likely to arise under the rule. To the extent the 
decision maker's imagination or foresight diverges from the reality that 
in fact occurs, the rule represents an imperfect fit between the desires 
of the rule maker and the results obtained by application of the rule. 
Thus, if the rule maker can in fact substitute observation for guesswork 
by examining a fair sample of factual situations before formulating 
a rule, the risk of imperfect fit is reduced, and the rule is more likely 
to achieve the results desired by the decision maker. 
Similar considerations provide at least part of the foundation for 
the case or controversy requirement of Article III. 27 The requirements 
of standing, ripeness, and mootness, in addition to providing an adver-
sary presentation of issues, also ensure that the Court is considering 
the formulation of a rule in the context of real facts. Although the 
factual situation then before the Court cannot necessarily be ta~en to 
be representative of the types of cases that will arise in application 
of the rule, one is still better than none, and the presence of a ripe 
controversy seems better than issuance of a merely advisory opinion 
without any concrete facts at all. 28 
Whatever the justifications for the Article III requirements, 29 they 
serve as a barrier to the exercise of the lawmaking function even when 
exercise of that function seems necessary. Yet apart from the Article 
III constraints, the various other decision-avoiding devices - pruden-
27. • See generally Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article Ill: Perspectives on the "Case or 
Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARv. L. REv. 297 (1979). 
28. United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146 (1961). See generally Field, The Advisory 
Opinion-An Analysis, 24 IND. L.J. 203 (1949); Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The 
Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363 (1973). 
29. See generally Brilmayer, supra note 27; Monaghan, supra note 28. 
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tial considerations,3° the "passive yirtues, mt the Ash wander rules32 -
all spring from a desire to achieve a "correct" .result rather than a 
desire to provide guidance. For whenever the Court avoids deciding 
a case, or avoids deciding the central issue in a case, the law in that 
area remains uncertain. And when the law remains uncertain, there 
is no guidance from an authoritative source for those who genuinely 
wish to do what the law requires. It is certainly not always true that 
it is less important that issues be decided correctly than that they be 
decided at all, 33 but it is an admonition that should not be ignored 
completely. Some.. issues, even some of those decided by the Supreme 
Court of the United States, are less momentous than others. Some areas 
of Supreme Court adjudication do not involve fundamental decisions 
regarding the course of the law or the course of life. In these areas, 
therefore, it is less vital that every effort be made to ensure that no 
decision is issued unless and until the "correct" result can be achieved. 
Consequently, the relative importance of certainty and predictability 
in many areas may be values that have recently been undervalued. 
In a way, the issue of decision-avoidance is peripheral to my primary 
theme of Supreme Court guidance in those cases it does decide. But 
decision-avoidance in part implicates many of the same themes. For 
when the Court fails to decide an issue at all, it may, in many cases, 
be failing to perform adequately or may simply be abdicating its 
guidance function. This is not, of course, always the case. When the 
Court fails to decide the "good faith" exception issue in Illinois v. 
Gates, 34 for example, it does nothing more than leave in place an existing 
body of Supreme Court precedent. 3S Failure to decide a particular case 
is not a failure of guidance if guidance already exists. 
In other situations, such as Princeton University v. Schmid, 36 the 
issues may arise sufficiently rarely that a failure to address the merits 
of the controversy entails few costs. But where the amount of lower 
court litigation indicates a recurring problem of considerable uncer-
tainty, as with the "nativity scene" issue finally before the Court, 37 
failure to decide the issue perpetuates a state of uncertainty. This is 
30. E.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). See generally LeBel, Standing 
After Havens Realty: A Critique and an Alternative Framework For Analysis, 1982 DUKE L.J. 1013. 
31. Bickel, The Passive Virtues, 15 HARv. L. REv. 40 (1961). 
32. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 {1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). · 
33. See W. MUEID., THE ROAD TO PERSUASION 241 (1956). 
34. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). 
35. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
36. 455 U.S. 100 (1982) (dismissing appeal for want of jurisdiction ·because university regula-
tion, allegedly violative of first, fifth, and fourteenth amendment rights, changed during pendency 
of appeal). 
37. Lynch v. Donnelly, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1766 (1983) 
(No. 82-1256). 
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not to say that the extent of a rule's uncertainty ought to be dispositive. 
It is, after all, desirable for the Court to reach the optimal result, and 
many of the techniques of decision-avoidance are designed to achieve 
this goal. Moreover, broader issues of Court legitimacy, power, and 
effectiveness may militate in favor of avoiding hearing a case or avoiding 
deciding it on the merits. 38 But achieving these goals, however laudable 
they may be, imposes a price when a failure to decide constitutes a 
failure to issue directives to those who are then in need of direction. 
Recognition of the inherent tension between the values served by 
decision-avoidance and the Court's guidance function implies nothing 
about the resolution of competing goals in any particular case. But 
we must recognize that there are competing goals, and that decision-
avoidance may often exact a high price that is not immediately ap-
parent if we focus only on the Supreme Court in isolation. 39 
v. 
Putting aside the question of decison-avoidance, my central concern 
is the process of issuing directives, of lawmaking, in those cases that 
the Court does decide. And at this point not only do I wish to put 
aside the question of decision-avoidance, but I also want to avoid the 
question of which way a case should be decided. Although strategic 
as well as substantive considerations may at times influence or even 
dictate the outcome of a case, 40 that is not my concern here. I shall 
take the broad contours of any particular decision as given and assume 
that the Court has determined what the outcome of the case is to be, 
and what, in very broad terms, justifies that outcome. The question, 
then, is, How should the Court formulate the result, the rule, and the 
opinion in light of recognition of its duty to provide leadership to those 
who must follow that opinion? There is no clear answer to this ques-
tion, and the considerations will vary from case to case. So what I 
want to do here is to identify some of those considerations and the 
ways in which they will be a function of particular features of the case 
before the Court. 
The Court's methodology in exercising its lawmaking function can 
be characterized in terms of three models of lawmaking: lawmaking 
38. See Bickel, supra note 31; cj. Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"- A 
Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 CotUM. L. REv. 1 (1964). 
39. It is, of course, tempting to focus only on the Supreme Court because there are a limited 
number of Supreme Court cases. Looking at the effect of Court doctrine is, quite simply, hard 
work. See Corr, Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme Court Doctrine "As Applied," 61 N.C.L. 
REV. 745 (1983) .. 
40. See Blasi, The Pathological Perspective on the First Amendment, 84 CotUM. L. REv. 
(forthcoming). 
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by example, lawmaking by general principles, and lawmaking by specific 
rules. The lines between these models are, of course, fuzzy, and no 
opinion will have all of the characteristics of one model and none of 
either of the others. Rather, every opinion will have at least some parts 
of all three models, with varying emphasis among the three. But the 
three styles, or approaches, are sufficiently different in focus that teasing 
out the distinction seems useful, even though the result is a loose 
categorization rather than a rigidly demarcated division. 
Lawmaking by example is lawmaking in the adjudicative mode. In 
this sense it is lawmaking in common law fashion. Cases are decided 
on a more or less ad hoc basis, 41 and only after a number of cases 
have been decided can we piece together broad principles to guide future 
adjudication. Now, when the Supreme Court decides a case in this man-
ner, it does not say that it is deciding by an ad hoc method. Nor does 
it simply announce its result, without any reasons attached. Rather, 
what characterizes a case that is decided in this mode is the particular 
effort to limit the ruling to the facts of the case or to a qUite narrow 
class of cases with decidedly similar facts. When, in New York v. 
· Ferber, 42 Justice Stevens expressed a desire to decide the case on the 
basis of the particular material and litigant before the Court, rather 
than to articulate a broad rule, he was expressing a desire, at least 
for the time being, to operate in this mode. The same desire is expressed 
in Justice White's concurrence in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. 
Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 43 in Justice Stewart's opinion in 
Craig v. Boren, 44 in Justice Powell's plurality opinion in Kassel v. Con-
solidated Freightways Corp., 4 s and in many other cases. In all of these 
the general perspective is the same. The Court, or some individual 
Justice, perceives that the case can be decided on narrow grounds, and 
thus uses those narrow grounds for reaching a particular result in the 
particular case. At times the narrow grounds may be a function of 
the factual peculiarities of the case at hand, as in Kassel and Min-
41. By "ad hoc" I mean that the agenda of adjudication is determined by the existence of 
particular controversies at a quite low level, and the emergence of the controversy before the 
courts is partly determined by factors over which the courts have no control, such as the absence 
of settlement, the willingness of the parties to pursue the matter, the ability of the parties to 
~fford counsel, and so on. 
42. 102 S. Ct. 3348, 3365 (1982) (Stevens, J ., concurring) (rejecting first amendment attack on 
a New York law designed to deal with child pornography by prohibiting the distribution of material 
depicting children engaged in sexual conduct without requiring the material to be legally obscene). 
43. 103 S. Ct. 1365, 1376 (1983) (White, J., concurring) (holding invalid a Minnesota user 
tax that applied only to large newspapers). 
44. 429 U.S. 190, 214 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment) (invalidating statute 
that allowed access to "near beer" to males of ages 18-20, but denies access to females of the 
same ages). 
45. 450 U.S. 662, 665-68 (1981) (invalidating Iowa statute that prohibited 65-foot double truck 
units as an impermissible burden on interstate commerce). 
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neapolis Star, and at times the narrow grounds may be a function of 
the usability of an existing standard to decide the case at hand and 
a reluctance to erect a new standard, as in Justice Stewart's opinion 
in Craig v. Boren. Most often these two factors - factual peculiarities 
and existing usable standards - will be intertwined, and thus presented 
in the same case, or the same argument. 
When the Court adjudicates in this style, it rejects a number of 
possibilities for a broader decision. It rejects the possibility of creating 
a new rule if this .case can be decided under an old one. It rejects the 
possibility of dealing with yet to be presented hypothetical cases (usually 
presented in "slippery slope"46 fashion) if this case can be decided 
without considering those cases, and it consequently rejects the possibility 
of laying down broad general guidelines, choosing instead to decide 
the case in the narrowest way possible. This approach is signaled by 
the catch-phrase "but we need not reach that issue. here, " 47 or its 
synonym "but we need not decide that question here. " 48 These and 
similar phrases announce to the reader of the opinion that the Court 
is going to decide as little as possible on this occasion. 
An opinion that is issued in this fashion, complete with all the caveats, 
qualifications, and disclaimers that festoon a narrowly decided case, 
is, by virtue of its adjudicative bias, the least effective as a directive. 
The greater the number of qualifications, the less the Court is saying. 
And the more an opinion is limited to a relatively specific factual pat-
tern, the less someone faced with a slightly different factual situation 
can rely on what the Court has already said. To the extent that the 
Court is cognizant of the fact that it hears only a limited number of 
cases and must guide with respect even to those cases that it cannot 
hear, 49 it will hesitate to rely too heavily on the adjudicative mode, 
of making law by example only, and will be reluctant to refrain from 
giving broad directives that govern and direct in a range of cases substan-
tially broader than the one that, perhaps fortuitously, happens to be 
before the Court. 
46. There is an important distinction that should be noted here. At times hypotheticals are 
presented to show the application of a putative rule to cases within the linguistic contours of 
that rule. And at other times hypotheticals are presented that lie outside the putative rule, but 
which, it is argued, represent realistic fears in terms of "the next step," or in terms of lower 
court misapplication of the rule. A court that is attentive to its guidance function will consider 
both possibilities. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 370-71 (G. 
Gunther & F. Schauer Supp. 1983). 
47. E.g., Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 116 n.33 (1979); United 
Jewish Orgs., Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 153 n.13 (1977). 
48. E.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856, 2870 n.l5 (1983); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 
366, 377 n.IO (1976). 
49. See Easterbrook, supra note 21, at 808. The specific characterization of the "guidance" 
function• is Professor Easterbrook's. /d. at 807. 
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Implicit in the adjudicative mode is the assumption, suggested by 
the name itself, that the range of problems is coextensive with the prob-
lems actually presented to the courts. But this assumption, when careful-
ly considered, is strikingly at odds with the reality of human and judicial 
behavior. 50 In many cases the existence of a judicial precedent will 
forestall any litigation whatsoever; but it would be a mistake to assume 
that the absence of litigation is, in this context, a sign that an underly-
ing factual controversy did not or could not have existed. 
Even the perspective that recognizes the effect of prior directives 
on the present scope of legal controversies is focused far too narrowly, 
because it ignores the enormous range of "legal events'' that never 
reach the lawyer's office. 51 To the extent that the law speaks with 
moderate clarity over a wide range of events in which people normally 
engage, the very clarity of the law, by preventing a controversy from 
arising in the first instance, is as much a legal event as controversy 
resulting from doubtful or unclear law. It is strange but true that many 
are quite willing to take breaking the law but not following the law 
as an example of what law is "all about." But it is, of course, not 
true that there would be no law if there were no disobedience of law, 52 
and thus the law serves an important function every time it channels 
behavior from where it would have gone in the absence of legal 
constraint. 
The discontinuity between problems presented by discrete cases and 
the range of potential problems is even greater in constitutional law, 
because the selective process by which the Supreme Court decides which 
cases to decide means that many cases will never reach the Court at 
all. 53 Yet there is a great deal of law involved in those cases that do 
not reach the Court, in those cases that never reach any court, and 
in those cases that never go to the lawyers' offices at all. Every time 
a police officer reads a Miranda warning exactly as it is on the card, 
every time that officer goes off to get a warrant even though he is 
absolutely sure that the search will yield the desired results, 54 every 
time a prosecutor does not prosecute a Communist for the simple act 
of being a Communist, 55 and every time a certain class of school 
50. See Lempert, More Tales of Two Courts: Exploring Changes in the "Dispute Settlement 
Function" of Trial Courts, 13 LAW & Soc. REv. 91, 99-100 (1978). 
51. For an expanded version of this point, see Schauer, supra note 15. 
s2: Indeed, to Bentham the ideal sanction was one that would never have to be imposed, 
and thus the ideal legal system would contain numerous but never-used sanctions. J. BENTHAM, 
OF LAWS IN GENERAL (H. Hart ed. 1970). 
53. .But see supra note 5. 
54. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). 
SS. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); Noto v. United States, 367 
u.s. 290 (1961). 
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districts does not create a separate school for blacks, 56 the Supreme 
Court's lawmaking function has operated as it should. Yet it is silly 
to suppose that the urges to engage in constitutionally relevant behavior 
can neatly coincide with the desire of the Supreme Court, or any court, 
to hear and decide the case. Thus, there will be instances in which 
guidance from the Court on the basis of previous cases will be desirable. 
But if the previous case says nothing except what is narrowly relevant 
to that case, the case will be ineffective lawmaking in the sense I am 
using the term. When no law is made, but when the factual situation 
arises, there is a void, with its consequent uncertainty. To the extent 
that the Court anticipates this problem, and is thus willing to write 
more than needed for a minimal rational explanation of the result, 57 
it prevents problems from arising; and in that sense it makes law 
effectively. 
Despite this, an argument in favor of a narrow and extensively 
qualified opinion relates to the Court's raw political power and 
theoretical legitimacy. The same reasons that might lead the Court to 
decline to decide a case could also lead it to decide the case as narrowly 
as possible. 58 To the extent that the Court decides too much, it may 
weaken its ability to decide when it really matters. 59 And if there are 
questions of legitimacy with respect to every exercise of judicial review, 60 
then each case before the Court presents, pro tanto, a good reason 
for deciding the case as narrowly as possible. 
Not only is this not the place to present counterarguments to these 
pervasive concerns, but I have no inclination to do so. That there are 
concerns that cut in the opposite direction does not indicate that these 
concerns are not legitimate. But there is a difference between what 
is a good argument, or reason, and what is, all things considered, the 
course of action to follow. Every argument for not deciding a case, 
or for deciding it as narrowly as possible, is not diminished by the 
presence of arguments that would militate in the opposite direction 
when deciding what, all things considered, to do. The values motivating 
arguments against the adjudicative mode and in favor of greater 
acknowledgment of the lawmaking function are often ignored as im-
portant factors that should be considered in this ultimate inquiry. But 
in arguing that these factors ought to be taken into account more often, 
56. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Brown v. Board 
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
57. What counts as a "minimal rational explanation" is an extremely difficult and complex 
issue, but in this context such a discussion would be .superfluous. All I am saying is that it is 
possible, and often desirable, for the Court to be quite detailed about its reasoning. See Easter-
brook, supra note 21, at 808. 
58. See Gunther, supra note 38. 
59. See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). 
60. See Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353 (1981). 
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I am not arguing that they can or should be often or even sometimes 
dispositive. · 
Alternatively, it might be argued that decisions rendered more broadly 
than is required by the facts of the case are decisions that are rendered 
against the background of an insufficient record. In refusing to qualify 
an opinion narrowly, the Court is in effect deciding cases not then 
before it and might be only guessing about the factual setting of such 
cases. The concern over the Court's elaboration of broad directives 
applicable to an undetermined range of future cases, which is not the 
same as a general desire for case-by-case adjudication, 61 is premised 
on the assumption that it is easier to decide cases in a concrete setting 
than it is to decide them based on speculation about what knid of fac-
tual setting might be presented. 62 But this assumption is only as valid 
as the gap between the factual speculation and factual reality. To the 
extent that the Court is deciding in advance controversies that have 
not and will not occur, and failing to decide actual controversies, there 
are indeed special dangers involved in deciding in advance of the con-
troversy itself. But to the extent that anticipatory adjudication accurately 
reflects and predicts a future but real state of affairs, the disadvan-
tages of anticipatory adjudication decrease. Thus, if lower court litiga-
tion and extensive familiarity with certain fact patterns enable the Court 
to know the types of cases that are likely to arise, this particular ob-
jection to broadly sweeping opinions is blunted~ But if the novelty of 
the issues is such that there is truly grave doubt about the future, then 
there are substantial problems with deciding cases that might never 
have to be decided. 
Finally, it is possible that opinions that are too unqualified will reduce 
the Court's own flexibility in deciding those cases in the future that 
cannot currently ·even be anticipated. Unlike the problem discussed just 
previously, here we are not concerned with the type of case that can 
be anticipated as a problem. A thorough search of both the lower court 
cases and the imaginations of the Justices might still omit some case 
that will arise despite a total inability to predict that that will happen. 
Indeed, it is not just a matter of "might," for the phenomenon of 
open texture63 is an inevitable and irremovable feature of the legal 
61. See Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 SuP. Cr. REv. 
285, 297 n.6S. 
62. See Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961); United Pub. Workers 
v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). 
63. I use "open texture" in its strict philosophical sense, not as a synonym for "vagueness;" 
Thus, "open texture" refers to the possibility that any term, or rule, no matter how specific, 
might under some currently unimaginable state of affairs present a difficult question of applica-
tion. See Waismann, Verifiability, in lome AND LANGUAGE (FIRST SERIES) 120-21 (A. Flew ed. 
1952); see also H. HART, supra note 6, at 121-32. 
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condition.64 For example, it was virtually impossible for the Court, 
at the time it decided Brown v. Board of Education,65 to have predicted 
the entire range of issues subsequently presented by affirmative 
action and racial line-drawing for noninvidious66 purposes. At the time 
the Court decided Brandenburg v. Ohio, 67 it certainly did not and pro-
bably could not have imagined the range of issues, arguably in tension 
with Brandenburg, raised by the litigation involving The Progressive.68 
And it seems unlikely that the decision and language in Ex parte 
McArdle69 were informed by a knowledge of the issues now being raised 
in connection with the use of the "exceptions and regulations" power 
in Article III to withdraw Supreme Court jurisdiction for reasons based 
on objections to specific rulings by the Court. 70 
The problem in these and many other cases is not that the Court 
did not think hard enough. A crafty law professor with a host of bizarre 
hypotheticals would not have enabled the Court to anticipate what 
evaded it. 71 Regardless of how much care is devoted to thinking of 
possible ramifications of a decision, something new can and usually 
will occur that goes well beyond the range of plausible contemplation 
at the time the first decision was rendered. 
In the face of this problem, it is possible that a lack of a safety 
valve or escape route in the first opinion will, when the new situation 
arises, increase the probability of tension between the opinions. If we 
expect the Court's decisions to be principled, following the rules set 
forth in earlier cases to the extent that those rules, on their face, govern 
the next case, 72 then is it not wise for the Court to refuse to fetter 
itself in the first case? Should it not decide the first case as narrowly 
as possible in order to maintain maximum flexibility to deal with the 
unforeseen? · 
To the extent that we are dealing here with the truly unforeseen and 
unforeseeable, such a strategy seems partly unattainable and partly un-
64. See H. HART, supra note 6, at 125-26. 
65. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
66. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
67. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
68. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.O. Wis. 1979), mandamus denied 
sub nom. Morland v. Sprecher, 443 U.S. 709 (1979), dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979). 
See Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REv. 
265, 297-99 (1981). 
69. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) (holding appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court derives 
from the Constitution and not from Congress). 
70. See generally Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword: Canstitutional Limita-
tions on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARv. L. 
REv. 17 (1981). 
71. See supra note 46. 
72. See generally Golding, Principled Decision-Making and the Supreme Court, 63 CoLUM . 
. L. REv. 35 (1963); Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 982 (1978). Both of the foregoing refine the notions in Wechsler, Toward Neutral Prin-
ciples of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959). 
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necessary. The goal is unattainable because the unforeseeable is just 
that - unforeseeable. If we are to plan for the unforeseeable, we are, 
in effect, destining ourselves to paralysis. Any decision, however nar-
row, is potentially in tension with what might be necessary under some 
as yet unimaginable set of facts. To plan for such a consequence would 
involve decisions that totally abdicated any pretense at a lawmaking 
function and dealt with everything on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, 
such an approach is unnecessary, because it cannot plausibly be con-
tended that the goals of precedent, stare decisis, and principled ad-
judication are absolute mandates. 73 Should the truly unforeseen arise, 
then the Court can simply acknowledge the force of precedent while 
at the same time holding that the facts now presented are sufficiently 
novel and compelling that the mandate of the rule articulated iri the 
earlier case will not be followed. Indeed, it is commonly acknowledged 
that stare decisis means less in the context of constitutional adjudica-
tion than it does in other contexts. 74 But that does not mean that it has 
no function whatsoever. Principles, including the principle of stare 
decisis, can still be effective even though they are not absolute or may 
vary in strength. 75 But once we recognize that the Court has the power, 
ex post facto, to engraft exceptions onto previously unqualified 
language, then there is no reason to suppose that allowing for the 
possibility of the unforeseen means that every decision of the Court 
must be narrowly constrained by exceptions, qualifications, caveats, 
and escape clauses. And if this is the case, then the argument from 
unforeseen facts and issues is ineffective in blunting the force of the 
argument for greater attention to the Court as lawmaker. 
G' VI. 
Lawmaking by general principles, the second model of opinion 
writing, is in sharp contrast to lawmaking by example, the adjudicative 
model just discussed. The adjudicative model starts with extremely nar-
row decisions and generates broad principles only over time, as certain 
regularities can be identified running through the narrow decisions. 
But lawmaking by general principles operates in exactly the opposite 
way. Here the Court starts with very broad and majestic statements, 
seemingly all-encompassing, and then narrows these principles as it pro-
ceeds to decide further cases arising under the principle. 
This model, at least in terms of authoritative statutory texts, is an 
established feature of American legal life. Lawmaking by general prin-
73. See Greenawalt, supra note 72, at 992-94. 
74. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983). 
See generally Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1979). 
75. See R. DwoRKIN, supra note 2, at 22-28. 
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ciples is a reasonably accurate characterization of constitutional ad-
judication under quite broad and abstract constitutional clauses, and 
it is also characteristic of adjudication under such general nonconstitu-
tional instruments as the Sherman Antitrust Act76 and Section lO(b) 
(and Rule lOb-5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.77 
In the examples just mentioned, the abstract statement has its origin 
in a statutory (or constitutional) text. But it is possible for the Court 
to operate in the same way in rendering its opinions. The Court's 
excessively expansive statements in Shelley v. Kraemer, 78 Harper v. 
Virginia Board of Elections, 19 and Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated 
School District, 80 for example, can be taken as instances of a strategy 
of whittling rather than building. For rather than constructing a precise 
principle out of small parts, the Court here is starting with a very large 
block and then whittling it down to size, just as it does under most 
constitutional provisions and a number of statutes. 
As with lawmaking by specific examples in the adjudicative model, 
this approach is not without its distinctive advantages. It allows the 
Court to perform an important function as the expositor of broad 
values, 81 and it also provides at the same time most of the advantages 
of open-endedness that were discussed with reference to the adjudicative 
model. But just as this model shares many of the advantages of the 
adjudicative model, it also shares most of its weaknesses. For an opin-
ion that is excessively expansive provides little, if any, more guidance 
than does an opinion that is excessively narrow. A lower court or other 
party that must apply a Supreme Court opinion to new facts is not 
likely to receive much guidance if the law that it must apply is presented 
in terms of little more specificity than "privacy,"82 "fundamental 
fairness,'' 83 "minimum contacts,"84 or "implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty. m' I am not saying that such emotive generalities serve 
76. 15 U.S.C. § I (1982). 
77. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) (1983). 
78. 334 U.S. I (1948) (stating that state enforcement of private discriminatory choices is state 
action). 
79. 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (stating that wealth is a suspect classification under the equal 
protection clause). 
80. 439 U.S. 410, 413-16 (1979) (stating that the text of the first amendment precludes 
distinguishing between public and private speech). 
81. Whether the Court does or can serve as a significant educational force in American life 
is an important question that deserves careful consideration. As a hypothesis, it seems likely 
that decisions such as Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and New York Times 
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam), serve to create public values as much 
as if not more than they reflect such values. This theme js dominant in the thinking of the Scan-
dinavian Realists, particularly W. LUNDSTEDT, LEGAL THINKING REvisED (1956). 
82. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
83. E.g., Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 515 (1981). 
84. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
85. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
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no purpose in constitutional adjudication. The broad ideas suggested 
by such vague phrases can . and do serve over time as significant 
touchstones to remind us of the importance of certain values, and are 
implicit statements of the priority of certain values. But such phrases, 
however powerful they are for some purposes, provide little comfort 
for the conscientious judge, legislator, or public employee who is uncer-
tain about how to decide a concrete case before him. 
When Congress enacts legislation in the broad and vague style of 
the Sherman Act, it can be interpreted as having delegated to the courts 
the task of developing a body of concrete rules and principles to govern 
actual cases. And it has at the same time declined to perform that 
very task itself. Similarly, when the Supreme Court decides a case by 
reference only to such general standards, it can be taken to have 
delegated to some other body86 the task of working out the specifics. 
This delegation, which might under some circumstances amount to ab-
dication, is not necessarily wrong, but it is a denial of the guidance 
and lawmaking function. Under some circumstances this may be the 
appropriate course, but it seems likely that this model is often used 
without a full appreciation of its implications in terms of the Court's 
lawmaking function. 
VII. 
The final model I wish to discuss is lawmaking by specific rules. 
This is the model that most closely resembles lawmaking by a legislative 
body in the "normal" manner, where quite specific guidance is given 
on how certain transactions should be dealt with. This is the model 
of Miranda, of Miller, and of any opinion that promulgates a specific 
test, usually one with three parts. 87 Some of these tests are of course 
more specific than others. The tests that the Court has set forth with 
respect to gender discrimination, 88 commercial speech, 89 tenth amend-
ment limitations on congressional action, 90 and incidental restrictions 
on speech/' for example, are all directed primarily to lower court judges 
making legal determinations, and they are all, as a result, not enor-
mously specific. Other tests, such as the obscenity test in Miller, and 
the defamation standards in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan92 and 
86. Most commonly, but not necessarily, that body will be a lower court. But it could be 
an administrative agency, the executive, or a legislature. 
87. Because all of the present Justices have at one time been law students, it is not surprising 
that they have retained the law student's love for three-part tests. 
88. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
89. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 551 (1980) .. 
90. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
91. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
92. 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
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Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc./3 seem directed primarily towards juries/4 
and are consequently more specific. And tests that are directed im-
mediately towards the citizen or the public official may be still more 
specific. 
But relative specificity is in some ways a side issue. For although 
the Court may at times be more or less successful in promulgating· 
specific rules, its attempt to promulgate such rules is evidence of the 
Court's cognizance of its lawmaking function. It is certainly fashionable 
in academic circles to mock specific tests, suggesting that perhaps there 
is more of the Realist in most of us than we would wish to admit, 95 
but exactly the same criticism could be leveled against a legislature. 
Once we realize that any court, and most especially the Supreme Court, 
is in the business of making law to be applied by others, the same 
standards that apply to legislative lawmaking can and should be applied 
to Supreme Court lawmaking. And if it is therefore appropriate to 
urge that legislatures act with some specificity, then so, too, it is ap-
propriate to suggest that the Supreme Court should also act with some 
specificity, writing opinions that contain the kinds of specific rules, 
standards, and tests that can be most helpful in applying the opinion 
to a wide range of specific instances not before the Supreme Court 
when it set forth the standard. 
When the Court is acting in this manner, one frequently sees the 
complaint that this is an example of judicial legislation, which is then 
taken as persuasive evidence that the Court is acting illegitimately. 96 
That is, if the Court produces a result that contains a test so specific 
that it looks legislative, then the charge is made that a legislature is 
the more appropriate body to make decisions of that type and that. 
therefore the Court is exceeding its authority. But this argument is simply 
a non sequitur. That a court, aware of its responsibility to guide other 
courts and other actors and entities, attempts to guide in a meaningful 
way implies nothing about the circumstances that justified its entry 
into the enterprise in the first place. What makes Roe v. Wade91 to 
many98 an illegitimate exercise of judicial power is not that the Court 
attempted to provide quite specific guidance to legislatures on what 
types of restrictions are permissible. 99 For its critics, Roe would have 
93. 418 u.s. 323 (1974). 
94. In both obscenity and defamation cases the standard to be applied is a constitutionally 
based one and thus requires judicial determination as well. 
95. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note I. 
96. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
97. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
98. E.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 
(1973); Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SuP. 
CT. REV. 159. 
99. See 410 U.S. at 164-65. 
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been equally illegitimate had it concluded its decision with an arnor:.. 
phous mandate prohibiting unreasonable restriction on a woman's right 
to have an abortion. 100 The standards that emerged from New York 
Times Co. v. Sul/ivan 101 are every bit as specific as those that emerged 
from Roe, yet to call New York Times an illegitimate exercise of judicial 
power or an unauthorized encroachment on the judicial function seems 
quite simply bizarre. 102 Conversely, Lochner v. New York, 103 the stan-
dard example of judicial encroachment on the legislative sphere, is no 
less illegitimate because the Court there did not specify with precision 
the exact contours of the freedom to contract, nor promulgate a three-
part test to determine what future legislative actions would be struck 
down as violative of the freedom. 
VIII. 
I have thus far argued that there are three models of judicial law-
making, lawmaking by example, lawmaking by general principles, and 
lawmaking by specific rules, and that the third of these is vastly superior 
to the first two in terms of the Court's responsibility to guide others. 
I have also suggested that the advantages of the other two models, 
however legitimate they may be, are insufficient to justify total ab-
dication of the lawmaking function by the Supreme Court. But if there 
are strong reasons that cut against an excessive concern with the Court's 
lawmaking and guidance_ function, then we should try to identify those 
factors that might be of importance in deciding how crucial the law-
making function is in a given instance. 
The most important factor to be considered is the nature of those 
who are to be guided. At times, as in most first amendment and equal 
protection cases, the Court will primarily be guiding lower courts. The 
same can be said for much of its work in the procedural area. 104 And 
when the nature of the subject matter is such that the Court's direc-
tives are aimed at other courts, the mandates can arguably be tailored 
to the presumed expertise of the courts that are to follow those man-
dates. Thus, in these instances a moderately general standard, or test, 
. 100. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481, 
2504 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
101. 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
102. I am not saying that New York Times is clearly correct, although I think it is. Rather, 
I am saying that decisions relating to interpreting the mandates of the first amendment in light 
of political speech are plainly legitimate. 
103. 198 u.s. 45 (1905). 
104. I am referring here primarily to constitutional restraints on civil procedure, including 
restraints on the exercise of personal jurisdiction, see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
326 U.S. 310 (1945), and limitations on prejudgment remedies, see North ·aeorgia Finishing, 
Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975). 
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may be sufficient, requiring the exercise of some judgment as that stan-
dard or test is applied to particular facts. This is what courts do all 
the time, and there may be no need, or at least less need, to provide 
a very specific and mechanical formula that removes all judgment from 
the lower court. 105 . 
This is not to say that the Court could not still be unsuccessful in 
guiding lower courts. When the Supreme Court's standards are simply 
confusing, or inconsistent, or so abstract as to be useless, then the 
Court has not succeeded in guiding even other courts, and it is prop-
erly criticized on these grounds} 06 But if the Court's standards are 
internally consistent, comprehensible, and sufficiently specific to channel 
decisions in a particular direction, then the lack of precision ought 
not by itself to be taken as an occasion for criticism. To say that the 
Supreme Court should guide lower courts is not to say that it should 
totally preempt their function. 
At other times the Court is speaking directly to legislatures. In Im-
migration~ and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 107 for example, the 
Court is quite simply telling Congress how, in a procedural sense, to 
legislate. In some respects Chadha is an excellent illustration of the 
theme of this Article, because the Court decided the two-house veto 
situation in the context of a one-house veto case. Thus, the decision 
was broader than necessary, but for that very reason it will be quite 
effective as a guide to Congress. 108 Although Congress and the 
legislatures of the states undoubtedly have legions of lawyers to inter-
pret Supreme Court opinions for them, much of the guidance can be 
conceived of as direct. We do not wish the legislatures to have to wonder 
constantly about whether their legislation is going to be struck down 
by the courts, and there are thus important advantages to bypassing 
the lower courts and talking directly to the concerned party, the 
legislature. This may at times require greater specificity, but there is 
the dear advantage of reducing the incidence of judicial-legislative con-
frontations, an advantage that parallels many of the reasons for deciding 
a case narrowly. Thus, it is not so clear that arguments about the limita-
tions on the judicial function always militate in favor of the narrow 
and highly qualified opinion. To the extent that a broad but clear opin-
ion reduces future exercises of judicial power, it may in the long run 
be more attentive to limitations on the judicial function than a nar-
lOS. It is, after all, impossible to come up with a "perfect code" that could "govern all 
possible combinations of circumstances." G. GoTTI.IEB, supra note 23, at 16. 
106. This is the nature of the criticism in Corr, supra note 39. 
107. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). 
108. I am not saying that Chadha has foreclosed every possible issue relating to the matters 
it decided, but only that it did foreclose a range of issues very likely to be raised. 
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rower decision that virtually guarantees continuing litigation and con-
tinuing confrontations between courts and legislatures. 
Finally, there are some decisions that speak directly to the individuals 
concerned. As I have emphasized, Miranda exemplifies this type of 
decision, but the same phenomenon appears in Connick v. Myers, 109 
in which the Court is speaking directly to governmental supervisors. 110 
Where it is likely that the Cpurt's mandates will have this kind of per-
. vasive impact on a day-to-day basis, speaking directly to the parties 
concerned has distinct advantages, and it is in this situation where the 
advantages of greatest specificity are most apparent. 
Another important factor that should be considered in deciding what 
type of decision to issue is the frequency of the likely occurrence of 
the situation. To the extent that the frequency of the occurrence of 
the situation before the Court is rare, the advantages of lawmaking 
by specific rule are minimal. For the very rareness of the situation 
makes it much more likely that every or at least most future instances 
can be reviewed by the Supreme Court, or at least some other appellate 
court. In these circumstances the guidance function can properly be 
subordinated to other concerns. But to the extent that the situation 
is extremely common, as is the case with arrests, searches and seizures, 
and so on, then the possibility of continuing judicial supervision, refine-
ment and reevaluation is nonexistent. Here the Supreme Court, or any 
appellate court, can hear only a tiny percentage of the number of in-
stances of application. As a result, the guidance function becomes of 
great importance, almost to the point of becoming the most signifi-
cant factor in formulating an opinion. ' 
Related to the frequency with which the situation arises is the ques-
tion of the costs of a lack of or delay of Supreme Court review. If 
the issue is one that has significant consequences to many people or 
to large programs, and is one that is being frequently litigated in lower 
courts, clear guidance seems imperative. In issues related to school 
financing, 111 for example, there seems to be little excuse to let major 
decisions about large expenditures affecting· millions of people remain 
in a state of continuing uncertainty. But where the underlying cir-
cumstances are less momentous, and where delay is less troublesome, 
some uncertainty pending frequent Supreme Court review may be a 
more acceptable price to pay for the advantages of delaying decisons. 
109. 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983) (holding that discharge of an assistant district attorney for cir-
culating a questionnaire that only minimally addressed issues of public interest did not violate 
claimant's first amendment rights). 
110. Whether the Court's "matter of public concern" standard will be workable is a separate 
question. 
Ill. What, for example, are the states to do in the wake of Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 
3062 (1983)? 
24 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 17:1 
IX. 
The ideas presented in this Article have been tentative, exploratory, 
and intentionally vague. I did not intend to offer much concrete 
guidance, a luxury I have because no one has entrusted me with the 
power of making law. But whether we wish to admit it ex.plicitly or 
not, we have granted the Supreme Court that power, and thus we have 
a right to expect of it more guidance and more attention to the needs 
of those who must follow its lead. The Court's decisions should be 
evaluated not only in terms of whether they are correct or incorrect, 
legitimate or illegitimate, but also in terms of whether they are usable 
by others. Performing this evaluation is perhaps less flashy than broad-
side criticism of results, but it may have much greater importance. It 
may be too much to expect that the Court will always reach the "cor-
rect" result, but it is not too much to expect that the Court will at 
least always perform its functions ~ith care. One of those functions 
is that of guiding others, and it is a function that deserves much closer 
attention. 
